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Introduction
In the early hours of 10 October 2009, after several hours of long and impassioned 
debate, Argentina’s Senate passed a new law which, on paper, is the biggest reform of 
the country’s regulatory framework for broadcasting in almost 30 years. When proposals 
to pass such a law were originally made public seven months earlier, at the opening of 
the new Parliamentary session, President Cristina Fernández Kirchner described media 
reform as a ‘historical debt to Argentine democracy’ (Página 12 2009a). The law, the Ley 
de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual 26.522 (the LSCA), states that its objective is 
to democratise the media landscape by de-concentrating media ownership (LSCA 2009: 
Art. 1), in order to ‘universalise’ access to information and communication technology. The 
LSCA also aims to divide the radio-spectrum into three parts: a third will be reserved for 
private	media	companies,	a	third	for	the	state,	and	a	third	for	non-profit	organisations	such	
as community groups, universities, and charities. In one key article, media corporations will 
have one year to comply with new limitations on the number and type of different media 
outlets that the new legislation permits them to possess (ibid.: Art.161). 
The new law also creates Radio y Televisión Argentina Sociedad del Estado (RTA SE), 
a new body that aims in theory to develop public service media to represent the plurality 
of voices and opinions in Argentine society. Although Argentina, as with much of Latin 
America, has a history of state-funded media that promotes the government of the day, 
public	media	based	on	the	principles	of	political	plurality	is	a	significant	development.	As	
such optimists see RTA SE as an important step for improving the range and quality of 
broadcasting in the country. Yet far from making the media more democratic, opponents of 
the law argue it is an attempt by the government to undermine critical voices and weaken 
freedom of expression in Argentina by increasing state control over the media. One of 
Latin America’s largest media conglomerates, Grupo Clarín, will be forced to sell off many 
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of its assets in order to comply with the legislation, and views LSCA in very different terms 
to	the	official	line.	The	headline	in	its	flagship	publication	Clarín (‘The Bugle’) the day 
after the law was passed is unequivocal in its opinion: ‘Now the Kirchners have the law to 
control the media’ (Clarín 2009j).  
In a recent comparative study, the mass media has been described as ‘the connective 
tissue of democracy’ (Gunther and Mughan 2000: 1). Accordingly, this dissertation seeks 
to pick a path between the competing claims and discover whether or not the ley de 
medios will enhance democracy in Argentina, or damage it. To do so, it will analyse the 
content of the legislation to highlight its strengths and weaknesses in this regard, but 
also the political context in which it was debated and sanctioned, including the legislative 
passage of the law. It will be supported by evidence from coverage of the LSCA in the print 
media, particularly the anti-Kirchner Clarín and left-wing Página 12 dailies, and from semi-
structured	interviews	with	academics,	think	tanks,	government	officials	and	journalists.	In	
doing so it may also be possible to understand how media regulation became a key policy 
of the Fernández government, and explain why this attempt at reform has been successful 
when a number of previous attempts in recent decades failed.  
Yet in terms of media reform, Argentina is not an isolated case in Latin America. The 
significance	of	a	trend	has	been	noted	by	the	foreign	press,	with	the	Guardian describing 
how	‘from	Argentina	to	Venezuela,	governments	have	identified	the	media	as	a	political	
obstacle’ (Guardian 2010). In July 2010, Uruguay became the latest country on to the 
continent to open the debate on national media regulation, with the government of 
President José Mujica announcing that it was seeking to reform the current broadcasting 
legislation (Página 12 2010b). In Ecuador, a major political debate continues over its 
own media reform law, which like the Argentine legislation, claims to democratise the 
broadcasting landscape (Hervieu and Samson 2010; Committee to Protect Journalists 
2009b). Yet reforms implemented in recent years in Venezuela by the government of 
Hugo Chávez have been the most controversial, and have been regularly criticised by 
international bodies.  Comparisons have been made between these reforms and the 
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Argentina’s legislation by those opposed to the ley de medios (e.g. Clarín 2009i), and 
accordingly this dissertation will assess the validity of these claims.  
The	first	chapter	of	this	dissertation	will	develop	an	analytical	framework	by	exploring	
some of the arguments surrounding the relationship between the media, the state and 
democracy, in particular the tension between government intervention and freedom 
of expression. Chapter 1 will also highlight where these challenges have particular 
resonance for Latin America, for example, how the role of the media as an independent 
watchdog is under threat by both commercial practices and state intervention. It will 
also analyse recent developments in this context in Venezuela.  Chapter 2 narrows the 
geographical	focus	of	the	dissertation,	and	is	divided	into	two	parts.	The	first	charts	the	
shifting	course	of	media	regulation	in	Argentina	over	the	last	40	years,	up	to	and	including	
the administration of Carlos Menem. This will place in an appropriate historical context 
the particular features in the interaction between the state and the media in the country, 
and help to explain the regulatory landscape in which LSCA was developed. The second 
analyses the deterioration in the relationship Cristina Fernández and her husband and 
predecessor, Néstor Kirchner (popularly known as ‘the penguins’ on account of being from 
southern Argentina) and Grupo Clarín by exploring the political battles which have led to 
an ‘undeclared war’ between the two adversaries (Interview 2010j), and seeks to provide 
an understanding of the political context of the regulatory reform. Chapter 3 concerns the 
LCSA itself, and by examining the key features of the law, it may be possible to show if the 
new legislation will create the new framework for a more democratic media in Argentina 
as its supporters hope to achieve, or whether the implications of this may lead to very 
different results. Using this analysis it will become clear if the legislation can or should be 
compared to developments in Venezuela.  
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CHAPTER 1
The media and democracy
the debate over the ley de medios in Argentina has been, and continues to be, 
intensely political, channelled through newspaper headlines, slogans and government 
announcements. The purpose of the following academic literature review is to make clear, 
through a balanced and objective approach, that important theoretical principles underpin 
the new legislation. This will help inform Chapter 3’s analysis of its democratic value.
Freedom of expression and freedom of the press
In liberal theories of democracy, a media that is independent from government interference 
is	essential	for	two	key	reasons.	Firstly,	it	ensures	the	flow	and	transmission	of	ideas	
to enable citizens to make free, informed political decisions (Street 2001: 252), while, 
secondly, it performs a vital watchdog function, keeping check on the power of the state in 
its role as the fourth estate (Lichtenberg 1990: 110).  The liberal history of press liberty has 
been	understood	as	‘an	epic,	heroic	fight	of	the	individual	against	political	power’	(Keane	
1991: 37), promoting the belief that any form of government control of the media will 
impinge on freedom of expression and therefore be to the detriment of these democratic 
functions of the press. In the late 17th and 18th centuries, according to this interpretation, 
a	link	was	forged	between	a	belief	in	a	free	press	and	a	free	market	(Keane	1991:	46),	
leading to the opinion that only the market should regulate the media. In describing this 
viewpoint, Nicholas Garnham writes how its supporters believe that ‘the market will provide 
appropriate institutions and processes of public communication on democratic polity’ 
(1990: 105).  
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Yet	in	recent	decades	the	idea	that	an	unfettered	media	landscape	is	universally	beneficial	
for democracy has come under increasing criticism (Garnham 1990; Keane 1991; 
Lichtenberg 1990). The expansion of the media, with its increasingly commercialised 
nature and dramatic technological advances, have changed it beyond recognition over the 
centuries, and as Lichtenberg states, one needs to challenge ‘the unthinking assumption 
that we are all better off if the mass media are left to their own devices’ (1990: 128). 
Critically, one must recognise that access to the media is now ‘distributed as unequally as 
other forms of power’, as Lichtenberg correctly argues (1990: 103), and that some form of 
regulation is required to reduce this inequality. Otherwise, economic forces will control and 
distribute	what	is	available	in	the	media,	and	decide	‘which	opinions	officially	gain	entry	in	
to the “market place of opinions”’ (Keane 1990: 90).  
The political philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjo is clear where he places the blame for the 
failure of an equitable media framework to emerge. ‘The ideal of freedom of expression’, 
he writes, ‘has proved to be a positive obstacle to sound mass communication’ (1985: 
557). Sound mass communication, based on the principles of a plurality of ideas and 
equality of access, has been prevented by the close relation between freedom of 
expression	and	a	belief	in	the	non-regulation	of	the	media	(1985:	553–4).	As	such,	to	quote	
John Keane, there is now ‘a structural contradiction between freedom of communication 
and unlimited freedom of the market’ (Keane 1991: 89). Thus we are left with two 
competing views, which Waisbord summarises in his work on the role of the press in Latin 
America: one which equates press freedom with a free market; the other which sees an 
unregulated	free	market	as	preventing	a	truly	free	press	(2000b:	3–4).	It	is	important	to	
explore in greater detail the reasons why supporters of the second view believe that an 
unregulated market-based media cannot properly perform its democratic functions. 
Concentration of ownership and the threat to pluralism
Without regulation, as several authors have argued, the media tends towards a 
concentration of ownership, which has a number of detrimental effects on the health of 
democracy (Keane: 1991; Baker 2007; Curran 2002). In an early study it was argued 
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that media owners push their own interests and agendas through their outlets, and since 
concentration reduces the number of different owners, fewer sources of information 
and views become available to citizens (Bagdikian 1986). In this manner, ownership 
concentration	militates	against	the	ideal	of	a	plurality	of	views	―	an	ideal	bound	up	
inextricably with the very concept of a democratic society (Ó Siochrú and Girard 2002: 7). 
In a recent analysis of the structure of media ownership in the United States it has been 
argued that the ‘dispersal of media ownership, like separation of powers, is a key structural 
safeguard for democracy’ (Baker 2007: 19). In Latin America, such a safeguard appears 
to be limited: an overview of global media governance marks out Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico for exhibiting particularly high levels of concentration (Siochrú and Girard 2002: 
30). Although McChesney classes the major conglomerates in Latin America, such as 
Grupo	Clarín,	Televisa	(Mexico)	and	Organizações	Globo	(Brazil)	as	‘second	tier	firms’,	
less powerful than their North American and European equivalents (2002: 155), within the 
national	context	their	influence	may	be	much	greater	than	their	relative	global	size.	Globo,	
for example, has been ‘likened to a parallel government’ in Brazil (Waisbord 2000a: 59).  
The problems of concentration of ownership in Latin America have recently been 
investigated in detail by two leading Argentine academics, Martín Becerra and Gabriel 
Mastrini (2009). In Los Dueños de la Palabra, they describe how concentration should be 
understood in three distinct ways. Horizontal concentration	is	when	a	media	firm	expands	
its number of products to increase its share of the market and produce economies of 
scale,	a	phenomenon	particularly	notable	in	the	field	of	print	media	(2009:	31).	Grupo	
Clarín, for example, achieved ‘unmatched horizontal expansion’ during the 1990s 
(Waisbord	1990a)	―	the	reasons	for	this	growth	will	be	more	fully	explored	in	the	following	
chapter. Secondly, vertical integration refers to investment in each phase of production. In 
audiovisual media, this would include both producing content and controlling the means 
of distribution (Becerra and Mastrini 2009: 31). Finally, the authors describe lateral or 
diagonal integration, in which a company invests in a variety of different types of media to 
reduce risk and increase income (ibid.). This is found in many instances in Latin America. 
In Argentina, Grupo Clarín is the dominant player in many areas, including print media, 
cable television, open access television, and radio (Becerra and Mastrini 2009: 60). In 
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the Latin American context, the problems that such concentration poses to democracy as 
outlined above have been recognised in the regional normative framework, with  Principle 
12 of the Inter-American Commission’s (IAHCR) Declaration on Principles of Freedom of 
Expression stating that:
Monopolies or oligopolies in the ownership and control of the communication media must 
be subject to anti-trust laws, as they conspireagainst democracy by limiting the plurality and 
diversity which ensure the full exercise of people’s right to information (IAHCR 2000).
Plurality in mass media is also at risk from the high economic cost of entering the market 
in	the	first	place,	which	excludes	certain	social	groups	(Curran	2002:	229).	As	the	journalist	
and press critic A.J. Leibling once quipped, ‘Freedom of the press belongs to those 
who own one’ (quoted in Baker 2007: 2). Again, Principle 12 of the IACHR Declaration 
recognises this problem, stating that ‘the concession of radio and television broadcast 
frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of 
access for all individuals’ (IACHR 2000). It is on such principles that the supporters of the 
LSCA in Argentina argue for de-concentration of ownership and the provision of access to 
the media for all social groups. 
Governments and the media: an unhealthy relationship?  
In the years following the return to democracy in the 1990s, the dominance of economic 
policies known as the Washington Consensus did not leave the media market untouched. 
In fact, the ‘trinity of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation [was] the mantra of the 
makers of media policies’ (Fox and Waisbord 2002: 6). In terms of the private media, 
an absence of regulation is arguably regulation by ‘what secures the greatest return for 
investors’	(Ó	Siochru	and	Girard	2002:	4).	Curran	argues	that	this	creates	the	danger	of	
media products becoming simply market-place commodities (2002: 226), when in fact 
media	products	are	more	than	just	consumer	goods	―	they	help	to	‘produce’	society	itself	
(Ó	Siochru	and	Girard	2002:	3).	More	specifically	problematic	for	the	institutional	role	of	
the media is the argument that since entertainment and human-interest stories are more 
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profitable	than	investigative	journalism,	private	media	no	longer	perform	their	watchdog	
function	effectively	(Curran	2002:	221).	Finally,	as	Curran	argues,	when	profit-driven	media	
companies form close links and interact with governments which need favourable media 
coverage,	there	is	a	serious	danger	of	a	corrupting	influence	on	the	ability	of	the	fourth	
estate to operate as a check on the abuse of power (ibid.). 
In Latin America, such a relationship is not a recent phenomenon. Waisbord argues that 
the history of the media in Latin American states can be characterised by ‘cooperation 
rather than adversarialism, mutual advantages rather than autonomy’ (2000a: 51). Print 
media, for example, were dependent on the state for importing machinery, subsidised 
paper and tax exemptions (Waisbord 2000b: 16). In return for these economic carrots, 
positive coverage of the government was expected, undermining the separation of the 
state and media (Waisbord 2000a: 58). Today, these problems continue, particularly 
with regard to state advertising, upon which many private media rely for funding. The 
arbitrary use of such advertising is considered to be one of the most serious ways in which 
governments can impinge on the freedom of expression in Latin America, and was the 
subject of a recent regional report by the Argentine Non-Government Organisation (NGO) 
Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (2008). In 2006, for example, critical coverage of 
Néstor Kirchner’s administration in the newspaper Perfil and the magazine Notícias saw 
all	state	advertising	to	both	publications	blocked	(ADC	2008:	35).	In	2003	the	Office	of	the	
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at the Organisation of American States 
(OAS)	produced	a	report	which	raised	serious	concerns	about	the	use	of	official	publicity	
(OAS 2003), while Principle 13 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Freedom of Expression is 
explicit that:
the	arbitrary	and	discriminatory	placement	of	official	advertising	and	government	loans	…	
with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide privileges to social 
communicators and communications media because of the opinions they express threaten 
freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law (IACHR 2000).
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Media reform in Venezuela:  regulation or censorship? 
In Latin America, some analysts have commented on a recent trend of governments 
taking measures against the private media in a populist manner (Dinatale and Gallo 
2010). According to experts, reform of old, outdated media legislation in Latin America is 
certainly required (Interview 2010d; Interview 2010c), and as shown there are regional 
standards that demand governments ensure both plurality within the media and equality of 
access in order to enhance freedom of expression. Yet in the same way that the popular 
catchphrases, such as Latin America’s ‘new left’ (Kozloff 2008) or the ‘pink tide’ (BBC 
News 2005), fail to capture the range of political ideologies in the region, equally in terms 
of media reform one must pick out the variation within general patterns. With regard to 
media regulation, it is crucial to distinguish between the regulation of structures, and the 
regulation of content (Goldberg et al. 1998): in terms of protecting freedom of expression, 
it is far preferable to place controls on the former (McQuail 2005: 235). As the case of 
Venezuela will demonstrate, the Chavez administration appears not to hold this distinction 
in high regard. 
One	of	the	most	significant	legislative	reforms	in	Venezuela	occurred	in	2004,	when	
President Chávez passed the Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Televisión, 
commonly known as the Ley Resorte. The chief objective of the law is to establish ‘the 
social responsibility of the providers of television and radio and their users to encourage 
democratic equilibrium between their duties, rights and interests in order to promote 
social justice and contribute to the formation of democracy, peace [and] human rights’ 
(Gobierno de Venezuela 2005: Art. 1). The law has come under considerable international 
criticism. A recent report by the IACHR repeated earlier concerns over the vagueness of 
Article 29 of the Ley Resorte, by which sanctions can be applied to any radio or television 
station that is deemed to ‘promote, advocate, or incite alterations of the public order’ 
(IACHR	2009:	paragraph	354).	Such	indeterminate	language,	according	to	the	report,	
allows for the arbitrary use of sanctions against critical voices (ibid.: paragraph 356), 
and in doing so could directly threaten freedom of expression. Equally worrying is the 
fact that the two authorities charged with applying the law, the National Commission for 
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Telecommunications (CONATEL) and the Social Responsibility Board lack the degree of 
impartiality and autonomy from the executive required for their functions (IACHR 2009: 
paragraphs 370–1).  
In 2007, the refusal to renew the terrestrial broadcast licence of Radio Caracas Television 
by	the	Chavez	government	reflected	exactly	the	kind	of	‘arbitrary	and	opaque	decision-
making process’ that had been feared, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists 
(Lauria and Gonzalez Rodriguez 2007). The government produced its ‘Libro Blanco Sobre 
RCTV’ to justify its decision, citing violations of various broadcasting laws (including a 
failure with regard to its social responsibility), and for ‘instigating civil war and a coup d’etat’ 
(Gobierno de Venezuela 2007: 11). The latter claim refers to the alleged involvement 
of	opposition	media	during	the	coup	of	April	2002,	which	saw	President	Chavez	briefly	
overthrown and imprisoned (for a recent detailed account, see Nelson 2009). Yet as 
Reporters Without Frontiers argued at the time, the participation of RCTV in the coup was 
never legally established, and as such the non-renewal of the licence was simply the result 
of a unilateral decision President Chavez without proper juridical backing (Cañizalez et al. 
2007).  
While it is possible to understand the antipathy that President Chavez feels for the 
opposition media in Venezuela for their role in 2002, it seems unlikely the current 
administration is truly concerned with creating a more equitable media landscape to 
enhance freedom of expression, despite its musings on concentration of ownership 
in the Libro Blanco (Gobierno de Venezuela 2007). As Eduardo Bertoni argues, the 
former Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at the Organisation for American 
States, there is a danger that media reform’s only achievement has been to change ‘the 
monopolies in the distribution of ideas from the private sector to the governmental sector’ 
(Interview 2010d). Keane, writing in 1991, warned that ‘public intervention in the market 
place must avoid slipping into the reductionist demonology of the evil media baron’ (1991: 
154),	yet	Chavez	seems	to	have	fallen	into	exactly	this	trap.	In	2009,	CONATEL	used	its	
regulatory powers to strip 23 radio stations and two television channels of their licences 
(Committee to Protect Journalists 2009), while in June 2010, the Venezuelan government 
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was condemned for ordering the arrest of Guillermo Zuloago, the owner of opposition 
television channel Globovisión (IACHR 2010).  
In the debate over the ley de medios in Argentina, the spectre of Venezuela has been 
raised by those opposed to the new legislation. The opposition deputy Francisco de 
Narvaez	claimed	that	the	efforts	of	the	Fernández	administration	to	‘control	the	media	…	
is no different to what Chávez has done in Venezuela’ (Clarín 2009i).  Earlier in 2009, the 
senator and national leader of the Union Civica Radical Geraldo Morales warned that if 
the ley de medios was passed, ‘Venezuela va a quedar un poroto al lado de la Argentina’ 
(Clarín 2009b), roughly meaning that what is happening in Venezuela won’t be a patch 
on the implications of the LSCA. In assessing the validity of such claims, it is important 
to remember that ‘national and cultural differences remain of enormous importance in 
shaping both the media and their regulation’ (Goldberg et al. 1998: 295). Chapter 2 will 
therefore place the Argentine ley de medios in its proper national, historical and political 
context.
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CHAPTER 2
The media and the state in Argentina
havIng explored the complexity of state-media relations on a theoretical level and in 
the	Latin	American	context,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	the	specific	case	of	Argentina.		In	the	
first	section	it	will	demonstrate	how	the	legacies	from	several	distinctive	historical	periods	
have combined to make regulatory reform ‘necessary and a matter of urgency’ (Asociación 
por los Derechos Civiles 2009: 1). These periods cover the nationalistic governments of 
Juan Domingo Perón; the authoritarian dictatorship of 1976–83; the return to democratic 
rule under Raúl Alfonsín; and the presidency of Carlos Menem. Changes and continuities 
will	be	highlighted	to	lay	the	groundwork	for	analysing	the	significance	of	the	new	ley de 
medios in the following chapter. The second section explores the relationship between the 
current president, Christina Fernández, and the private media, which may help to explain 
why media policy has become so important for her administration.   
PART ONE: Historical antecedents
From Peron to ‘El Proceso’
In	his	initial	period	as	president	of	Argentina	(1946–55),	Juan	Domingo	Perón	was	the	first	
leader of Argentina to fully grasp the political possibilities of the media, developing both 
the	country’s	broadcasting	structure	(including	the	creation	of	the	first	television	station, 
Canal 7) and forming its early regulatory framework (Arriba 2005: 102). By the time of 
his overthrow by the military in 1955, he had consolidated control over the majority of the 
media, either indirectly or directly (Mastrini 2009: 108).  Not only did Peron help to create 
a	‘historical	identification	of	the	public	sector	with	the	government	in	power’	(Landi	1988:	
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142),	but	worse,	to	quote	a	leading	scholar	on	the	history	of	Latin	American	media,	‘the	
Peronist experience of political manipulation of the media left a strong imprint of state 
control, censorship and commercial corruption on Argentine broadcasting’ (Fox 1988b: 
41).	These	negative	features	were	only	to	be	enhanced	by	the	military	dictatorships	which	
followed Perón. 
The most brutal and repressive of these was the most recent, when military leaders 
implemented the Process of National Reorganisation (El Proceso) between 1976 and 
1983. The death and disappearance of thousands of citizens by means of organised 
state terror cannot be covered here (see CONADEP 1986) but in terms of the politics 
of communication, the junta relied heavily on propaganda (Feitlowitz 1998), censorship 
and control, both direct and indirect (Potolski and Marino 2009: 186). In the kind of 
contradictory approach that characterised the policies of the regime, the junta preached 
the discourse of economic liberalism but rarely released its grip on the media (ibid. 178). 
The	previous	elected	government,	led	first	by	Perón	on	his	return	from	exile	in	1973	and	
then by his wife Isabel, had re-nationalised the three main private television networks 
(Muraro 1988: 116): the junta did nothing to reverse the expropriation despite its ‘declared 
principles against state intervention in any sector of the economy’ (ibid. 117).  
Although some newspapers maintained a bravely critical stance against the regime, 
most notably the English-language Buenos Aires Herald (Terrero 1982: 33), other media 
companies have rather more blemished records. It was not unusual for sections of the 
media to support dictatorships in Latin America. In Chile, for example, El Mercurio vocally 
advocated the overthrow of President Allende (Waisbord 2000b: 19). Three leading 
Argentine newspapers — Clarín, La Razón, and La Nación — have been accused of 
‘complicity with state terrorism’ due to their joint ownership,  with the regime of Papel 
Prensa, of the national newsprint factory (Cecchini and Mancinelli 2010: 17). As will be 
explored in the second part of this chapter, these allegations have become part of a 
government discourse that ties the leading media companies to the military dictatorship. 
In reality, there was no uniform relation between media companies and the regime. 
Potolski and Marino have argued that Clarín, for example, gradually developed a critical 
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posture with regard to the economic policies of the junta, while others such as La Razón 
maintained solid support (2009: 172).
In	terms	of	regulation,	the	most	significant	development	was	the	sanctioning	of	Ley de 
Radiodifusión 22.285 in 1980, which continued to be the basic broadcasting legislation 
in Argentina until 2009. In certain respects it demonstrated a keen neoliberal character, 
discriminating	against	non-profit	organisations	in	the	awarding	of	broadcast	licences	
(Potolski and Marino 2005: 179). Yet at the same time it forbade foreign investment in the 
media, and imposed limits on ownership, for example prohibiting print media owners from 
having	investments	in	broadcasting	(ibid:	180).	Perhaps	most	significantly,	the	law	gave	
sole	responsibility	for	the	awarding	of	licences	to	the	executive,	through	the	offices	of	
the Comité Federal de Radiodifusión, known as COMFER (Galperín 2002: 28). Although 
membership of the armed forces to the board of COMFER ended with the return to 
democracy in 1983, its centralised and unaccountable nature as a regulatory body would 
continue until the LSCA was sanctioned. However, perhaps the most damaging legacy of 
the dictatorship regarding the relationship between the state and media was that it has 
been	used	as	‘a	permanent	warning	against	state	intervention’	(Landi	1988:	147).	The	
early experience of Peronist manipulation of public media, and the activities of the junta in 
terms of censorship and control of broadcasting, have created an understandable fear of 
any kind of state intervention, but in doing so limited until recently the terms of debate over 
media regulation. 
The administrations of Alfonsín and Menem
During the administration of Raúl Alfonsín, who was elected to power after the collapse 
of the military junta in 1983, there were limited attempts at media reform, but more 
serious challenges to the new and fragile democracy took precedence (Fox 1988: 30). 
These included tackling the human rights abuses of El Proceso and coping with the 
major economic crisis of the 1980s (Com 2009). Neither a new broadcasting law nor a 
major	reorganisation	of	the	communications	sector’s	public	administration,	identified	by	
Landi as the most important changes needed for the media, took place during Alfonsín’s 
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tenure	(1988:	141).	The	COMFER	organisation	remained	unaccountable,	with	a	single	
government-appointed	official	(the	interventor) replacing the military men who previously 
oversaw it (Interview 2010k). Vested interests in the both the government (which did not 
want to see a publicly-administered institution overseeing state broadcasting) and with 
the private media (who were reluctant to open up the market to new players) combined 
to	impede	reform	(Landi	1988:	147).	Although	there	was	arguably	a	degree	of	consensus	
over a broadcasting bill in 1987 (Interview 2010f), the fact that it was debated during an 
election year effectively doomed it to failure, as deputies on both sides feared upsetting 
private media companies and risking prejudicial coverage of their campaigns (Com 2009: 
204).		
Far	more	significant	for	the	media	landscape	in	Argentina	was	the	presidency	of	Carlos	
Menem, who succeeded Alfonsín in 1989. After criticising the free-market reforms of 
the	Washington	Consensus	while	campaigning	for	office,	upon	election	Menem	forced	
through a programme of economic liberalisation, by which he ‘dismantled barriers to trade 
and privatised nearly all the state’s vast holdings’ (Reid 2007: 127). Arguably amongst 
all the changes that occurred in Argentina during the Menem years, the deregulation of 
the communications industry was ‘among the most dramatic’ (Galperín 2002: 22). The 
1989 legislation which provided the legal basis for selling off state assets, the Ley de 
Reforma del Estado 23.696 (Vialey et al.	2008:	14),	also	amended	parts	of	the	old	Ley de 
Radiodifusión, and enabled the formation of multimedia conglomerates in Argentina (Rossi 
2009:	241).	The	law	not	only	mandated	the	privatisation	of	all	state-owned	commercial	
stations, but it lifted the restrictions that had prevented newspaper owners from entering 
the broadcast arena (Galperín 2002: 29). A term used to describe the rapid liberalisation of 
Portugal’s media system, following the collapse of the Salazar regime, seems appropriate 
for the Argentine experience: ‘savage deregulation’ (Traquina 1995). There was a dramatic 
increase in vertical and horizontal integration, with print media companies such as Grupo 
Clarín coming to dominate in cable and satellite television and radio (Vialey et al. 2008: 
15), creating a new map of media ownership by the middle of the 1990s that was ‘hyper-
commercial	and	strongly	concentrated’	(Rossi	2009:	242).	The	map	was	dominated	by	two	
conglomerates, Grupo Clarín and CEI Citicorp (Vialey et al. 2008: 15).
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Writing	in	the	years	after	President	Menem	had	left	office	in	1999,	Hernán	Galperín	argued	
that in regard to the media and communications industry, ‘the old regulatory system has 
simply been loosened, without much public debate, and without being replaced by a 
new	regulatory	regime’	(2002:	24).	The	lack	of	consultation	over	policy	was	a	key	feature	
of Menem’s rule, and his charisma and dependence on the presidential decree made 
Argentina an archetypal ‘delegative democracy’ in which the weakness of institutional 
checks	and	balances	was	exploited	by	the	executive	(O’Donnell	1994).	It	has	been	argued	
that such an approach was essential to tackle the grave economic crisis that Argentina 
faced	in	1989	(Peruzzotti	2001:	144),	but	there	is	perhaps	some	truth	in	the	argument	that	
Menem was able to minimise public debate on his neoliberal reforms in the private media 
by enabling their rapid expansion, and therefore gain their political support (Vialey et al. 
2008:	14).	The	institutional	and	legislative	reform	needed	to	keep	pace	with	technological	
expansion and the growth of media conglomerates never occurred, with no single law 
specific	to	communications	being	passed	by	Menem	(Galperín	2002:	30).	Without	this	
necessary institutional reform (ibid: 36), the legacy of Menem’s tenure was a media system 
characterised by the problems associated with such deregulation: a high concentration 
of	ownership,	leading	to	the	kind	of	democratic	deficiencies	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter.
PART TWO: Recent developments
Media regulation under Néstor Kirchner
The policies of Carlos Menem ‘developed a legal-political structure that [had] virtually 
eliminated any obstacles or restraints for the creation of multimedia giants’ (Vialey et 
al. 2008: 25). As a result, the media lobby was so powerful that even in the wake of 
Argentina’s	devastating	financial	crisis	of	2001	(see	Blustein	2005),	the	government	
exempted ‘cultural industries’ from a new bankruptcy law that allowed foreign creditors to 
take over Argentine companies which defaulted on their debts (Becerra and Mastrini 2010: 
617). It is important to point out that this favourable regulatory framework was made even 
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more so under Néstor Kirchner, in stark contrast to the changes implemented by his wife 
and successor, Cristina Fernández. 
Two	examples	are	sufficient	to	demonstrate	this.	Firstly,	under	Decree	527/05,	
broadcasting licences were extended for a further ten years (Centro de Estudios Legales 
y	Sociales	[CELS]	2010:	299).	Secondly,	in	virtually	the	final	act	of	his	presidency,	Néstor	
Kirchner allowed the merger of the two leading cable providers, Cablevisión (owned by 
Grupo Clarín) and Multicanal (ibid.). In this regard, the current Fernández administration 
has performed a volte-face in its attempt to change the regulatory framework ‘for the 
first	time	in	recent	history’	(Becerra	and	Mastrini	2010:	613).	This	change	can	only	be	
explained in the context of a relationship between Grupo Clarín and Christina Fernández 
that was transformed in March 2008. The events of the ‘crisis in the countryside’ that led 
to this change deserve a dissertation of their own, but the key elements will be covered 
here. Nonetheless it is an important example of an increasingly divisive political discourse 
promoted by the Fernández administration which attempts to place the present-day 
struggle with Grupo Clarín within the bitter historical context of the dictatorship and 
Argentina’s ‘Dirty Wars’. 
El crisis de campo
There is a consensus that the relationship between the Kirchners and Grupo Clarín was 
changed beyond recognition by the events of March and April 2008, in what became 
known as ‘the crisis of the countryside’ (Interview 2010h; Interview 2010c). In brief, 
Christina Fernández wanted to increase taxes on agricultural products (in particular, 
soya) by introducing a sliding scale for export duties based on world prices. It was an act 
of severe political misjudgement, as thousands of landowners and producers protested 
against the measures with strikes and roadblocks. Moreover, middle-class porteños took to 
the streets of Buenos Aires in a traditional pot-banging protest (a cacerolazo) in support of 
the rural provinces, as they feared their food supplies could be at risk (Tenembaum 2010: 
158).	Coverage	of	the	crisis	placed	the	media	outlets	of	Grupo	Clarín	firmly	in	support	of	
the farmers, much to the chagrin of President Fernández, though as the journalist Ernesto 
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Tenembaum has pointed out many editorials in Clarín also expressed alarm at some of 
the methods used by the rural protesters (2010: 162). The crisis became so serious that 
President Fernández put the tax measure, Resolution 125, to a Congressional vote. In the 
Senate, Vice-President Julio Cobos voted against the resolution in the deciding vote, in 
the name of ‘social peace’ (Página 12 2008): President Fernández has not spoken to her 
deputy since. Fernández has blamed Clarín’s coverage of the crisis for the setbacks of her 
party in the congressional elections of June 2009 (CPJ 2010c).  
At its height, Fernández compared the rural strike to one that occurred shortly before the 
coup d’etat of 1976, but said that ‘this time, [the strikers] are accompanied not by tanks 
but by media generals’ (Clarín 2008a).  From this moment, according to Tenembaum, 
the	conflict	between	Clarín and the Kirchners acquired an intensity that ‘nobody could 
— or wanted — to stop’ (Tenembaum 2010: 279). As an aside, Resolution 125 drew on 
legislation sanctioned by General Videla in 1981 (the Código Aduanero), one of many 
dictatorship-era laws that have not been repealed since 1983 (Mendelevich 2008: 135), 
and a fact not publicised by the government. In contrast, one of the prime arguments of 
the government when it came to media reform was that the existing legislation, the Ley de 
Radiofusión, was sanctioned in 1980 during the dictatorship. It would appear that invoking 
the need to repeal legislation dating from the dictatorship is as much a case of political 
expediency as a genuine desire to shed Argentina of its authoritarian legacies.  
Unresolved tensions: Grupo Clarín and the dictatorship 
The discourse which links Grupo Clarín with the dictatorship can also be seen in three 
further	examples,	the	cumulatively	bitter	nature	of	this	political	conflict	with	the	government	
creating	‘a	zero-sum	game’	between	the	opposing	sides	(Tenembaum	2010:	279).	The	first	
concerns football, Argentina’s great national passion. Since 1991, the rights to broadcast 
Premier	Division	matches	had	been	held	by	Televisión	Satelital	Codificada	(TSC),	a	
cable channel jointly owned by Grupo Clarín and Torneos y Competencías (TyC). In 
the	midst	of	a	near	financial	collapse	of	the	league	in	2009,	the	Fernández	government	
bought the rights to show all Premier matches, which would be broadcast free-to-air on 
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terrestrial television. This ensuing programme, ‘Fútbol Para Todos’ has been described 
as ‘football populism’ (Zuñino 2010: 308), welcomed by many but at a questionable 
financial	cost	(La Nación 2009a). When the deal with the Argentine Football Association 
was announced, President Fernández proclaimed that ‘I don’t want a society of kidnapped 
people, kidnapped images nor kidnapped goals’ (Perfil 2009). To make the ‘unfortunate 
comparison’ (Quiroga 2010: 132) between the broadcasting rights of football matches 
(which under the TSC arrangement could only be seen on cable television) and the horrors 
of the dictatorship was at best clumsy, at worst tasteless and crass.  
The second example concerns the legal case was brought in 2002 against Ernestina 
Noble de Herrera, the main shareholder of Grupo Clarín, by the Abuelas de Plaza del 
Mayo (APM), an NGO which aims to discover the whereabouts of the children of those 
who were kidnapped or had disappeared during the last dictatorship. In 1976 Noble de 
Herrera had adopted two babies, Marcela and Felipe, whom the Abuelas claimed were in 
fact children whose parents had been killed by the regime (APM 2008). In November 2009, 
the Fernández administration sanctioned a new law which made giving DNA samples in 
such cases compulsory; the Noble de Herrera case remains unresolved, however. Critics 
of the new law argued it threatened personal liberties, and was an attempt to undermine 
Grupo Clarín (La Nación 2009b).  
Thirdly,	and	most	recently,	the	government	released	an	official	report	on	Papel	Prensa	
which claims to give irrefutable evidence that shares in the printing press were acquired 
by Clarín, La Nación and La Razon newspapers through extortionate means during the 
dictatorship (MECON 2010). The government, which has a minority stake in the company, 
argues newsprint is in the national interest and must be available to all (Presidencia de la 
Nación Argentina 2010), but the implications of this could be a potentially dangerous shift 
from regulating broadcasting to regulating print media.
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Conflict as a form of government? 
Arguably, the discourse that forges links between Grupo Clarín and the dictatorship is a 
specifically	Argentine	manifestation	of	a	broader	regional	trend	highlighted	by	Dinatale	
and Gallo in a recent volume. They have argued that several presidents in Latin America, 
including Chavez, Correa, Evo Morales and Christina Fernández, are using the private 
media as an enemy against which to strengthen their own standing with the electorate 
(2010). In Argentina, placing people into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ categories has been one 
of	defining	features	of	the	Kirchners’	presidencies	(Interview	2010c).	In	some	ways,	this	
vision is part of a far longer tradition of political dichotomy in the country. The commentator 
and journalist Pablo Mendelevich’s   recent book on Argentina, entitled El país de las 
antimonias (2008), attempts to challenge the reductionism in Argentina’s political history 
which has pitted Unitarian against Federalist, Perónist against anti-Perónist, the people 
against the oligarchy. The ‘quintessence of irreducible antagonism’ in Argentina is that 
which exists between the capital’s two leading football teams, River Plate and Boca 
Juniors (Mendelevich 2008: 15), and it is perhaps no surprise that some Argentines have 
described	the	government’s	conflict	with	Grupo	Clarín	in	such	terms	(Interview	2010e).					
While the rural crisis appears to be the catalyst which led to President Fernández’s 
decision to ‘assume the political cost’ of taking on the powerful interests of Grupo 
Clarín, (Interview 2010i), it must be appreciated that there was already in place a 
strong civil society lobby which sought to reform the media. This lobby, the Coalicíon 
por	una	Radiodifusión	Democrática	(CRD),	was	formed	in	2004	and	its	membership	
included communication studies departments in universities, trades unions, human 
rights organisations, and community radio groups. Its founding document, 21 Points for 
Democratic Broadcasting, laid out the key principles needed for reforming broadcasting 
regulation. This included the right of citizens to ‘receive and diffuse information, opinions 
and ideas’, the notion that state broadcasting must be based on principles of public service 
(and	not	the	ideals	of	the	government),	the	promotion	of	not-for-profit	media	and	the	
need for limitation on ownership (CRD 2010). These 21 Points would provide the basis 
for the future ley de medios (Interview 2010h) but it seems unlikely that the CRD would 
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have succeeded in its goal of reforming broadcasting legislation without the desire within 
elements of the Fernández administration to weaken Grupo Clarín. As such, critics have 
described the government interest in media reform as an act of political opportunism 
(Interview 2010c). Yet whether such opportunism negates the democratic worth of the 
proposed reforms can only really be seen in the light of the legislation itself. This will be the 
subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
The audiovisual communications law
as the twIn narratIves of civil society pressure for media reform and a political 
power struggle between the Kirchners and Grupo Clarín became interwoven, changes to 
broadcasting regulation became a matter of urgency for the government within the context 
of the congressional changes wrought by the June elections: when the new deputies 
took their seats in December, opposition parties would be strengthened. The resulting 
legislation, Ley 26.522 Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual, was eventually sanctioned 
on 10 October 2009.  After outlining its legislative passage, this chapter will discuss in 
detail three substantive aspects of the law most germane to the discussion of democracy 
and the media in Argentina. Firstly, it will describe articles  concerned with limiting 
ownership in the media market: as chapter two explained, concentration in this area can 
have detrimental effects on the quality of democratic debate in a society.  Secondly, it will 
look at the new regulatory bodies that have been created by the legislation and, thirdly, it 
will address provisions with the law related to public service broadcasting.   
These three examples demonstrate that the ley de medios is fundamentally concerned 
with implementing structural changes to the media landscape, rather than the control of 
content. As highlighted earlier, this is a key distinction in terms of broadcasting regulation 
(Goldberg et al. 1998: 16), and moreover distinguishes the Argentine case from what 
has happened in Venezuela. It would be inaccurate to state that the ley de medios has 
no bearing on content. For example, certain articles make requirements for quotas of 
nationally produced material that must be broadcast, (LSCA 2009: Arts. 65 and 67). These 
types of articles are not unusual for broadcasting legislation, and indeed the supporting 
notes point to similar requirements in French law (LSCA 2009: notes to Art. 67). Yet in 
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general terms, the ley de medios should not be cast in the same category as Venezuela’s 
ley resorte, which explicitly allows for arbitrary censorship by placing legal restraints 
on the type of political content that can broadcast. Argentina’s legislation tackles vital 
structural problems, which have the potential to enhance, rather than decrease, freedom of 
expression.  




bill mentioned during the presidential address, which covered in more general terms 
the	need	for	greater	government	intervention	in	the	context	of	the	global	financial	crisis	
(Clarín 2009a). It immediately attracted criticism from opposition politicians, which was 
sarcastically rejected by the President as a part of the ‘I Oppose Everything Movement’: 
the rejection of government policy regardless of content. (Clarín 2009c)
When the draft bill was presented around two weeks later, President Fernández claimed 
that ‘this is not Christina’s bill, nor the government’s, nor of a party, but a proposal we 
put to the consideration of all Argentines’ (Clarín	2009e).	It	is	difficult	to	believe	that	
this was said with complete honesty. Symbolically, the bill was presented at the Teatro 
Argentino in La Plata, where Christina had launched both her senatorial and presidential 
campaigns. Moreover, Clarín highlighted that party political ‘music and iconography’ was 
used during the presentation of the bill, and that aftewards a group of activists from the 
Peronist Youth chanted anti-Clarín slogans (Clarín 2009e). Of course, the newspaper had 
its own motivations for highlighting these aspects of the launch, but it should be noted that 
the Konrad Adenaeur Foundation turned down a government request for information on 
European public service broadcasting, perceiving that the bill was party political in nature, 
and that any involvement would compromise the foundation’s apolitical ideals (Interview 
2010c). On the other hand, Clarín failed to report the inclusive nature of a speech made 
by Gabriel Mariotti, the then COMFER interventor, in which he praised the efforts of 
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past legislators in their efforts to reform broadcasting legislation, singling out the Radical 
senator Ricardo Lafferiere (Página 12 2009b).  
After the launch of the draft bill, there was a period of public consultation before the formal 
presentation	of	an	amended	bill	in	parliament	on	27	August	2009.		This	included	24	public	
forums in various cities across the country, 80 meetings, and the submission by members 
of the public of around 15,000 opinions and suggestions (Página 12 2009d). As CELS, 
the human rights organisation, has noted, these resulted in some 200 contributions being 
made to the text of the legislation (2010: 300). Frank La Rue, UN Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom	of	Expression,	specifically	praised	the	government	for	‘having	consulted	with	
the people’ (TELAM 2009). Graciela Peñafort, legal director for the new regulatory body 
AFSCA, argues that the consultative nature of the bill means that the resulting legislation 
should be considered as ‘a collective construction’, not simply the work of the government 
(Interview 2010i).  
The	parliamentary	debate	that	followed	saw	a	number	of	modifications	which	‘in	most	
cases improved the government bill’ (CELS 2010: 300). These included important changes 
to the regulatory bodies created by the law, as will be explained in the third section of this 
chapter. In order to garner the support of left-wing parties, the government introduced 
clauses that forbade telephone companies from entering the audiovisual market and 
offering ‘Triple Play’ packages (the joint provision of telephone, satellite television 
and internet services), arguing that these would have enabled new opportunities for 
monopolisation (CELS 2010: 301). Comparing these procedures with the broadcasting 
legislation situation in Venezuela, Eduardo Bertoni, the former Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression at the OAS, made an important point with regard to this question 
of parliamentary debate. As he explained, ‘the government [in Argentina] sent the draft to 
the	Congress,	first	to	the	lower	house.	The	lower	house	started	discussing	it.	Discussing 
it. This is a simple word, but if you think about discussion of the law in Venezuela, you are 
thinking about a different country, not Venezuela’ (Interview 2010d). 
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Several legal injunctions have since been brought against the ley de medios which fell into 
broadly two categories: those which questioned the legality of the law in its entirety, on the 
basis	of	alleged	parliamentary	irregularities,	and	those	which	challenged	specific	articles	
(such as Article 161: see section two of this chapter).  Martín Becerra, an expert witness 
during the senatorial hearings, agreed that the parliamentary procedure ‘was not the best’, 
but in this regard ‘the law is not an exception’ (Interview 2010b). Similarly, Bertoni has 
queried	why	this	specific	law	rather	than	countless	others	was	being	challenged	on	issues	
of procedure (Interview 2010d). At the time of writing, some of these injunctions remain 
unresolved.  
De-concentrating the Argentine media market
Arguably the most important articles in the ley de medios are those that address questions 
of concentration of media ownership by seeking to increase the range of providers in 
the market. Firstly, the law distinguishes between three types of media providers: state, 
private	for-profit	and	private	non-profit	(such	as	community	radio	stations)	(LSCA	2009:	
Art. 21), and legally guarantees access to the radio-electrical spectrum for the latter group. 
This	tripartite	distinction	is	justified	by	supporting	evidence	from	international	norms	and	
comparative national legislation, including Britain and France. For example, the notes to 
Article 21 refer to the joint meeting of the OAS and UN on freedom of expression held 
in 2007, which proclaimed that ‘different types of broadcasters — commercial, public 
service and community — should be able to operate on, and have equitable access to, 
all	available	distribution	platforms.	Specific	measures	to	promote	diversity	may	include	
reservation of adequate frequencies for different types of broadcasters’ (LSCA 2009: notes 
to Art. 21). Curran has argued that ensuring media pluralism cannot simply be equated 
with ensuring competition — more fundamentally, it concerns making the ability to take 
part in that competition open to all (2002: 237). That is why this part of the ley de medios is 
so	significant	in	terms	of	broadening	the	range	of	voices	in	the	democratic	debate.	One	of	
Argentina’s leading human rights organisations (CELS) has remarked that the law enables 
‘historically excluded sectors’ to add their voice to this debate (2010: 307).  
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Certain articles attempt to reduce the problems of concentration of ownership that have 
characterised	Argentina	and	Latin	America	since	the	early	1990s.	Article	45	states	that	
‘in order to guarantee the principles of diversity, plurality and respect for the local culture, 
limitations are established on the concentration of licences’. For Martín Becerra, this is 
one	of	the	most	significant	aspects	of	the	new	legislation	(Interview	2010b).	If	a	company	
holds a licence for a satellite television provider, such as Cablevisión, it is illegal to hold 
any other type of audiovisual media licence, for example, those of the actual channels 
that	are	broadcast	through	that	provider		(LSCA	2009:	Art.	45.1.a).	The	implications	of	
this for Grupo Clarín were explained in an internal email to staff working for its subsidiary 
company Artear, warning that if Grupo Clarín retained Cablevisión, it would have to sell 
off its television channels, such as Todos Notícias and Canal 13, and vice-versa (De Elía 
2009). The legislation therefore breaks the vertical integration between distribution and 
production. An investigative journalist for ‘Telenoche’, the leading daily news programme 
broadcast on Canal 13, believes this to be the ‘only thing’ positive about the law, even 
though it puts his job at risk (Interview 2010e). 
Secondly, the law sets limits on the number of each different type of media outlet any 
one company can own, such as radio stations or cable television channels, and also 
distinguishes between national and local broadcasting. At the national level, that law states 
that a single company cannot provide	‘services	to	more	than	thirty-five	per	cent	(35%)	of	
the	country’s	population	or	subscribers	…	as	the	case	may	be’	(LSCA	2009:	Art.	45.1.c).	
Given their size, multimedia conglomerates such as Grupo Clarín will be forced to sell off 
a number of radio stations and local television stations, with a time limit of one year being 
set within which companies must comply with the legislation (LSCA 2009: Art. 161). This 
article, known as the ‘disinvestment clause’ has been amongst the most controversial of 
all. Grupo Clarín has brought a legal challenge to the Supreme Court that argues Article 
161 contradicts the right to property, and the case currently limits the full implementation 
of the legislation (Página 12 2010a). Market fundamentalists have long dismissed the 
argument that citizens can claim a right to a share of the media market (for example, by 
regulating ownership) as ‘a particularly egregious example of demanding a right to the 
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labour of others’, arguing that the right of access to the media should not be considered a 
basic necessity on the order of food or shelter (1990: 81),
Yet	according	to	a	senior	official	in	the	new	regulatory	body,	this	tension	between	freedom	
of expression and property rights is a false one (Interview 2010i).   Freedom of expression, 
as	explained	in	Chapter	1,	is	one	of	the	defining	features	of	a	liberal	democracy,	but	is	
undermined by a concentration of ownership in the media market — one of the hallmarks 
of the previous regulatory environment in Argentina.  Government regulation that takes 
steps to address questions of plurality and diversity should be welcomed, and on this 
issue, the ley de medios seems to meet the earlier calls of academics such as Tännsjo 
(1985) and Keane (1990; 1991) for a fairer media system. It also meets international 
standards, and indeed Frank La Rue has stated publicly, as reported by the national news 
agency TELAM, that ‘Argentina	is	setting	a	precedent	…	and	I	believe	it	is	an	example	
not only for Latin America but for the whole world’ (2009). Critically though, whether or 
not the legislation is applied in a democratic, transparent and fair manner depends on 
the regulatory bodies which will implement the law. These are the subject of the following 
section.  
Regulatory bodies
In a comparative study of media regulation, Goldberg et al. have noted a tendency 
towards the creation of specialist regulatory agencies (1998: 310), and in the Argentine 
case, several new bodies are being created under the ley de medios, of which two 
deserve particular attention. The most important of these is the Federal Authority of 
Audiovisual Communication Services (AFSCA), the body responsible for applying and 
enforcing the law (LSCA 2009: Art. 12). The second is the Federal Council for Audiovisual 
Communication (CFCA), an advisory body comprised of a wide range of representatives 
from	local	government,	private	and	non-profit	media,	unions,	university	broadcasters,	and	
indigenous groups amongst others (LSCA: Art. 16). In terms of management, AFSCA 
will have a seven-member board of directors.  Two directors, including the chairman, 
are nominated by the executive; two are chosen from candidates nominated by CFCA; 
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and three are proposed by the Bicameral Committee on the Promotion and Monitoring 
of Audiovisual Communication. The Bicameral Committee, comprised of deputies and 
senators, makes its three proposals based on the political composition of Congress: one 
by	the	majority	or	first	minority	party	(or	bloc),	one	by	the	second	minority,	and	one	by	the	
third	minority	(LSCA	2009:	Art.	14).
It would be hyperbolic to say that AFSCA is ‘probably the most advanced body in the 
world’, as its director of legal affairs does (Interview 2010i).  Nonetheless, it is a highly 
significant	improvement	to	the	old	regulatory	body	COMFER,	which	had	given	the	
executive absolute discretion in broadcasting matters with ‘no parliamentary control and 
no degree of participation from different sectors of society’ (ADC 2009: 2). The 2008 
report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at the OAS argues that ‘it is 
fundamental that the bodies with oversight or regulatory authority over the communications 
media be independent of the executive branch’ (2009: 217).  Given the composition of its 
board of directors, AFSCA cannot be classed as truly autonomous, but it is important to 
note	that	a	number	of	modifications	were	made	during	the	legislative	passage	that	have	
improved its independence through the plurality its members. In the draft bill, AFSCA was 
to	have	only	five	directors,	of	whom	two	would	be	appointed	by	the	executive	and	three	
chosen by the Bicameral Commission on the terms outlined above: as one of these would 
be selected from the majority party in Parliament, it would effectively give a majority to the 
executive	(ADC	2009:	4).	Increasing	the	number	of	directors	to	seven,	by	bringing	in	the	
two directors proposed by the Federal Council, is an important step in diluting government 
influence	over	AFSCA.	It	is	also	important	to	note	the	AFSCA	directors	will	serve	for	four-
year periods that will not coincide with those of the presidential mandate (LSCA 2009: Art. 
14),	which	had	been	a	concern	of	the	ADC	(2009:	4).		
Despite these normative advances, serious political challenges remain for creation 
of	a	genuinely	plural	regulatory	body,	best	highlighted	by	the	ongoing	difficulties	in	
filling	AFSCA’s	board	of	directors.	Opposition	parties	currently	refuse	to	recognise	the	
composition of the Bicameral Commission, because the Commission was formed shortly 
before the change of deputies in December 2009 (six months after the June elections) and 
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hence have not nominated their candidates for AFSCA (CELS 2010: 312). This has left 
the	board	with	only	five	members,	whose	appointments	have	not	remained	unchallenged.	
Both opposition politicians and NGOs contested the executive’s nomination to the AFSCA 
board of Jorge Capitanich, the governor of Chaco Province, considering that his current 
role would prevent Capitanich from devoting the time and energy required to be a director 
of AFSCA (CELS 2010: 311).  However, Capitanich remains in place, with the executive 
stating	that	the	concerns	‘lacked	sufficient	merit’	(ibid.).	The	Federal	Council,	for	its	part,	
was criticised for a lack of consultation when appointing its two nominated directors (Clarín 
2009k). 
It is certainly arguable that the board of AFSCA, lacking almost of third of its members, has 
questionable legitimacy. Yet one must not lose sight of the improvement from COMFER. 
Argentina now has a regulatory body which, in theory, represents the views of not just the 
executive, but opposition parties and sectors of wider society. While not perfect, in terms 
of	promoting	democratic	pluralism	within	the	regulatory	framework	this	is	a	significant	step	
forward. Graciela Peñafort, AFSCA’s director of legal affairs, has criticised the opposition 
parties of failing in their political responsibility by not nominating members to the board 
(Interview 2010i), and it is possible to sympathise with her frustration. Reporting on the 
ley de medios, CELS states that opposition parties have used ‘all possible resources 
to erode the validity of the new norm’ (2010: 309). The democratic credibility of AFSCA 
would be strengthened if opposition politicians nominated members to its board. If fearful 
of government tendencies, the best place to moderate these would be by working within 
the new framework. In sharp contrast, this is not a matter of choice in Venezuela: there is 
no parliamentary opposition to speak of, and the regulatory body CONATEL is controlled 
solely by the executive.  
Public service broadcasting 
Beyond tackling media concentration and the formation of new regulatory bodies, the ley 
de medios	also	attempts	to	find	an	answer	to	the	question	of	public	service	broadcasting	
in Argentina. Article 119 creates the aforementioned RTA SE, a new body ‘responsible 
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for managing, operating and developing audio and television broadcasting services 
owned by the national State’ (LSCA 2009: Art. 119). In academic literature public service 
broadcasting is often considered to be a defence against ‘the twin threats of totalitarian 
propaganda and the crass commercialisation of market-driven programming’ (Keane 1992: 
116). A range of approaches to public broadcasting exists, from the politically independent 
professional model of the British Broadcasting Corporation to the more corporatist model 
found	in	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	(Hallin	and	Mancini	2004:	31),	but	the	critical	
feature is that in each case they seek to represent all sectors of society in the name of 
democratic pluralism, regardless of the political inclinations of the current executive.  
Although Article 121, part b) states that one of the objectives of RTA SE will be to ‘respect 
and promote political, religious, social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic plurality’ (LSCA 2009: 
Art. 121), scepticism is widespread that it will truly achieve this goal. In Latin America, 
there is little tradition of public broadcasting based on such principles: government 
broadcasting is usually the only alternative to private media (Waisbord 2000a: 60). 
Given that most Latin American countries have experience of authoritarian governments 
using state media as vehicles for propaganda, or of periods in which censorship was the 
only real way in which the state made its presence felt in the media (Fox 1988: 15), it is 
perhaps understandable there is wariness about the idea of public service broadcasting. 
Regionally, as Bertoni puts it, ‘understanding that a public service media is not a 
governmental	branch	for	communication	is	very	difficult’	(Interview	2010d).	While	culture	
secretary and  former head of COMFER Julio Bárbaro claims that public television existed 
until  Alfonsín’s presidency (Interview 2010a), in reality public broadcasting in Argentina 
has usually promoted the ideals of the government of the day.
By the 1990s, Latin American public television was in a ‘desolate’ state, suffering from 
both a lack of credibility and infrastructural problems (Fuenzalida 2009: 11). However, 
one national example stands out as a notable exception to this pessimistic picture. 
From 1992 onwards, Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) has been reformed to such an 
extent that it is now institutionalised as a public entity autonomous from the government 
(Tironi and Sunkel 2000: 186), and perhaps more importantly it is considered credible 
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and politically neutral by the Chilean public (Fuenzalida 2009: 15–16). Interestingly, 
while making comparisons with a range of national case studies, such as the Australian 
Broadcasting Company and RTVE, Spain’s public broadcaster, the notes to Article 119 of 
the LSCA clearly state the intention to use the Chilean model as a basis for the structural 
organisation of RTA SE (LSCA 2009: note to Art. 119). Like AFSCA, the RTA SE board will 
have seven members, who will have been selected in virtually the same way (LSCA 2009: 
Art.	132).	The	current	chairman,	Tristan	Bauer,	is	a	noted	Argentine	television	and	film	
director, who was also instrumental in creating Canal Encuentro, a cable channel funded 
by the Ministry of Education which produces cultural and educational programmes (La 
Nación	24/10/07).	Significantly,	unlike	the	pro-government	news	coverage	provided	by	
the state Canal 7, Canal Encuentro is generally considered to be non-partisan: a channel 
in which you can see ‘the spirit of public television’ (Interview 2010d). If Bauer can bring 
such qualities to the newly created RTA SE it will be an advance in the nature of Argentine 
public broadcasting. 
Nevertheless, concerns have already been raised about the political nature of other 
appointments to the RTA SE board. On 30 June the executive appointed the former 
Cordoba deputy and agronomic engineer Alberto Cantero Gutierrez to the board 
of	directors,	on	account	of	his	‘scientific,	academic	and	parliamentary’	experience	
(Clarín 2010a). Clarín claimed the appointment was a reward for Gutierrez’s loyalty to 
the Kirchners, given he chaired the congressional Agriculture Committee during the 
countryside crisis in 2009 and supported Resolution 125 (ibid).  What seems more 
important is that Article 131 of the LSCA clearly states that members of RTA SE’s board 
of	directors	‘shall	be	highly	qualified	professionals	in	matters	of	communication and shall 
have a well-established democratic background’ (LSCA 2009: Art. 131). Gutierrez’s career 
as an agronomic engineer would not appear to qualify him for a role in the management 
of a public broadcasting body. It is a clear example of divergence from the legislation as 
written and its implementation.  In theory, the creation of RTA SE is an important step 
forward in institutionalising democratic pluralism within Argentina’s state-funded media, but 
unless	a	non-partisan	culture	is	allowed	to	develop	within	the	organisation,	it	is	difficult	to	
be entirely optimistic that it will follow TVN Chile in becoming a successful model for public 
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broadcasting in Latin America. Recently, debates over exactly how apolitical TVN is have 
emerged in the wake of Sebastian Piñera’s election to the presidency (La Tercera 2010), 
but nonetheless it is still the best regional model to which Argentina can aspire.
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CONCLUSIONS
Current concerns and long-term benefits
The purpose of this investigation has been two-fold: to analyse the veracity of claims that 
the ley de medios ‘democratises’ the media landscape in Argentina, and to see if the law 
should be compared with media reform elsewhere in Latin America. Before drawing any 
conclusions on the nature of Argentina’s ley de medios, it is important to recall some of the 
key features of the media system that existed in the country prior to the new legislation. 
Concentration of media ownership was amongst the highest in Latin America; regulation 
was conducted by a body directly and solely answerable to the executive; and state-
owned television had a long tradition of promoting the views of the government, rather 
than representing all voices in society. The new law, whose content is largely based on the 
principles developed by the civil society campaign of the Coalición por una Radiodifusión 
Democrática, has the potential, as demonstrated, to improve all three of these features. It 
has embraced the principle that in a democratic society, the right to freedom of expression 
means more than just the freedom to express one’s views and opinions without fear of 
repression. The right also ‘requires that a special effort be made to provide access to 
public	debate	under	equal	conditions	and	without	any	type	of	discrimination	…	[and]	
assumes special conditions of inclusion to allow all sectors of society to exercise this right 
effectively’ (IACHR 2009: 188).
Of course, it is highly probable that the passing of the ley de medios would not have 
occurred had the Fernández administration not been in the midst of a political power 
struggle with Grupo Clarín, the leading media conglomerate in Argentina. Yet this raises 
questions over intentions and outcomes. In the black-and-white political worldview of 
the Kirchners, Grupo Clarín had clearly fallen into the enemy category after the crisis del 
campo. Although the Kirchners have arguably used the ley de medios as a weapon in the 
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ensuing	conflict,	this	does	not	de-legitimise	the	potential	benefits	that	have	come	from	the	
new legislation. As Martín Becerra argues, rather than ‘looking at the present in absolute 
terms’,	what	is	important	is	that,	long	after	the	Kirchners	have	left	office,	the	legislation	
will be in place and will have transformed the media for the better in Argentina (Interview 
2010b). Nonetheless, the political environment has undoubtedly been detrimental to the 
quality of debate over media reform in Argentina, where polemical soundbites have been 
preferred to profound discussion. 
To argue that the law is an improvement in terms of the media’s democratic nature is 
not to claim it is free from weaknesses. Luis Lozano of CELS, one of the organisations 
comprising the Coalición, has admitted it could certainly be improved upon, by ensuring, 
for example, that the board of AFSCA is made up of independent, non-political appointees 
(Interview 2010h): a measure that would have avoided some of its current membership 
problems. In this regard, the Kirchners did not heed the advice of Chile’s National 
Television Council president, which the ley de medios seeks in part to emulate: legislate as 
if you will always be in opposition (Clarín 2009h). In terms of public service broadcasting, 
the ley de medios will not mean that state television and radio will be instilled overnight 
with a spirit of pluralism and editorial independence, but its existence at least creates the 
legislative	framework	on	which	such	a	political	culture	may	develop.	But	most	significantly,	
in terms of the democratic credentials of the relationship between the state and the media, 
the ley de medios has been a missed opportunity for establishing legal norms to limit 
the creeping growth of government advertising that has been a feature of both Kirchner 
administrations (O’Donnell 2007). This trend is far more of a concern to freedom of 
expression than legitimate efforts to de-concentrate media ownership.   
The regional context: Hitler in the pampas? 
Nonetheless, Argentina’s ley de medios is an important advance, and efforts to compare 
it with the worrying attacks on the media in Venezuela are questionable. As one should 
remain sceptical of umbrella terms like ‘the new left’ when used to describe a disparate 
range of political ideologies, it is important to be as aware of the differences between 
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trends in broadcasting regulation as the similarities. Not only is the actual legislation 
in Argentina of a type different to Venezuela’s, based as it is on structural and not 
content regulation, but the institutional framework in which that legislation was been 
debated and implemented is utterly distinct. Opposition claims in Argentina that a kind of 
Venezuelisation of the media landscape will occur may be successful as a scaremongering 
tactic,	but	as	this	dissertation	has	argued,	they	are	fundamentally	flawed.	An	editorial	in	
Página 12 made a humorous but perceptive comment when the bill for the ley de medios 
was presented in August 2009.  Referring to the adage that as any debate progresses, the 
probability of Hitler being mentioned increases, it remarked that ‘in these pampas, Hitler is 
usually substituted for Hugo Chávez’ (Página 12 2009c).  
Moreover, the renewed interest in the role of Latin American media and its articulation 
with state regulation requires a greater introspection on the part of media owners and 
journalists.	Eduardo	Bertoni	has	suggested	the	need	for	‘reflection’	on	their	part	to	better	
understand	why	we	are	witnessing	increased	regulation	―	or,	in	the	case	of	Venezuela,	
censorship (Interview 2010d). Crucially, those involved in  commercial media must be able 
to distinguish between valid criticisms of current media ethics and practices, and attacks 
on freedom of expression (Interview 2010j). One leading regional body, the Inter-American 
Press Association, currently seems incapable of doing so, casting damning resolutions 
on Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador, for example (IAPA 2010). In this context, more 
research is needed to explore how media responsibility, both in Latin America and 
beyond, could ‘involve a shift away from regulation as narrowly conceived in the minds 
and	practices	of	parliaments	and	councils	towards	a	more	ethically	oriented	and	reflexive	
profession’ (Silverstone 2007: 171).  
An unfinished debate 
Huge challenges remain for broadcasting in Argentina. Ongoing court cases over the 
ley de medios mean its full implementation is not guaranteed. Technological progress 
ensures that regulation will require continual analysis. For example, plans for a digital 
switchover have run alongside the debate over the ley de medios, but there is surprisingly 
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little mention of it in the law itself (see LSCA 2009: Arts. 92–3).  For its supporters, 
digitalisation offers new possibilities to ‘advance greater pluralism and cultural diversity’ 
in both the public and commercial sectors (Bauer 2010: 13), and the government has 
already	distributed	millions	of	set-top	boxes	to	those	on	state	benefits,	enabling	them	to	
receive Canal 7 and	for	the	first	time	Canal Encuentro, the educational channel created 
by Tristan Bauer (Perfil 2010a). While AFSCA is legally-bound to report on technological 
developments	twice	a	year	(LSCA	2009:	Art.	45),	the	failure	to	incorporate	the	latest	mobile	
phone technology and new media forms such as YouTube into the legislation means that, 
for some critics, the ley de medios is already antiquated, and has created a new normative 
framework that ‘fails to represent reality’ (Interview 2010j). How the latest technologies 
will enhance or impinge on the promotion of freedom of expression remains to be seen. 
The ley de medios is a grand step in the right direction towards democratic pluralism and 
equality within the media, but many further steps will be needed to keep pace with change. 
The only observation that can be made with any certainty is that the sanctioning of the ley 
de medios has raised as many questions as the answers it has produced on the tensions 
between freedom of expression and state regulation in a democratic society. That the 
debate on such issues continues is no bad thing. As John Keane has wisely argued, a 
society ‘which contains no controversies over freedom of expression and representation, is 
a society that is surely dying, or dead’ (Keane 1991: 191).
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